Corporate Governance as a Crucial Factor in Achieving Sustainable Corporate Performance

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ABSTRACT

In the developed stock markets the corporate governance aspect is crucial in the stock portfolio selection process for investor seeking to achieve shareholder value sustainability. In the emerging markets the importance of the corporate governance role just starts to be realized by the investors and by the corporate managers.

The present research, looking at the stock performance leaders and laggards, analyzes whether the corporate governance system matters to achieve long-term shareholder value within the Central and Eastern European stock markets universe. Corporate governance quality was assessed and compared among the out- and underperformers. The financial results plausibility and the ownership structure were considered as well. Additionally, the authors analyzed whether the quality of corporate governance influences the economic performance of the company.

The obtained results provide the proof that the corporate governance does matter as the market outperformers have above average corporate governance quality and provide trustworthy financial results more often than the underperforming companies. Besides, well-governed companies are also able to deliver more attractive financial results.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Ownership structure, Earnings quality, stock performance, CEE equity markets, Economic performance.

1. INTRODUCTION

The topic of the corporate governance is being thoroughly discussed within the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) stock markets, and obviously the companies succeed in their efforts bringing their corporate governance systems to the world-class quality standards, complying with the best practice principles (Bistrova, 2014). But the question is about the pay-off and the trade-off between the investments in the corporate governance system establishment and the decent economic and market performance.

It is a well-known fact that the „evil” stock indices significantly beat the stock indices comprised of only SRI complying companies (Lobe, Walkshäusl, 2008). However, there are also the studies proving that it is worth investing in the companies sticking to the high level of CSR as they deliver market-neutral or above market average performance (Arx & Ziegler, 2008; Wang, 2011).

However, being SRI compliant and having excellent management team and supervisory board organization is just one side of the corporate governance system. The other and the most influential stock performance wise is the ethical side of the earnings management as well as the ownership structure particularly in the regions, where the concentrated shareholding is widely spread phenomenon.

Central and Eastern European companies quite often have major owner in the capital structure, who is also being very active in the routine company management (Lace, Bistrova & Kozlovkis, 2013). Besides, the creative accounting practices tend to emerge on the corporate landscape of CEE countries quite often (Bistrova, 2014). All these factors undoubtedly affect the performance of the CEE investors’ stock portfolios.

Moreover, low level of corporate transparency and low media coverage typical for the emerging markets could lead to the non-normal return distribution (Connover, 2011). Therefore, the majority of investors in CEE companies appreciate very good information disclosure, which could positively influence the stock performance of the company in the long-term.

Thus, the aim of the present study is to find out to what extent the above mentioned corporate governance system elements affect the stock performance.

The study’s principal hypothesis is the following:
The companies having good corporate governance quality and high earnings plausibility demonstrate sustainably good economic and market performance.

Additionally, the authors checked to what extent the shareholder structure influences stock performance. For these purposes the ownership classification was developed offering to distinguish major owners by the type (the aim of the shareholding) and by the location. The authors verified whether high ownership concentration structure adds more value when investing in the companies.

Second part of the research was dedicated to understanding the relationship between the quality of the corporate governance and the financial results of the company such as capital profitability, margin level leverage level and efficiency of the asset management.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Content analysis on the shareholder value sustainability factors mentioned in the scientific articles proves that the corporate governance factor gains importance (Bistrova, 2014). It enjoys more attention than it used to both from the corporates and from the active investors’ side, who often see the necessity to integrate this factor into the portfolio selection process.

A number of studies conducted on the developed markets state that the corporate governance has strong influence on the stock market returns. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) constructed “Governance Index”, which covered the assessment of shareholders’ rights at 1,500 companies in 1990s. Based on the index, they have modeled the portfolio strategy that would consider ‘long’ companies with strongest rights (lowest decile) and ‘short’ companies with weakest rights (highest decile). As a result, the investor could earn 8.5% outperformance. Similar study was done by Drobetz et al. (2003) in Germany showing the monthly difference in performance of well and poorly governed firms of 1.73%.

The significant correlation of such factors as CG index, CEO-Chairman separation and independence of board members with stock performance was found by Bhagat and Bolton (2008). But they did not find any evidence to prove the assumption that the quality of CG is a proxy for future stock performance. The findings of their study also show that given the low quality of corporate governance of a certain entity and given its poor performance, there is a high probability of management turnover.

Positive correlation between the firm value and the quality of corporate governance in case of 300 largest European companies (FTSE Eurotop 300) has been indicated by Dutch scientists Bauer, Guenster, Otten (2004). But when adjusting for country difference, the relationship is weakening.

The contrary situation was discovered in Japan by Aman and Nguyen (2007), who discovered that poorly governed firms outperform well-governed firms. The results were statistically insignificant, but the study clearly showed that significantly higher risk is attributed to the poorly governed firms.

Some research was conducted considering separate factors, which determine the quality of corporate governance. Strong relationship was identified between equity performance and board independence (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Bhagat & Black, 2002), stock ownership of board members (Bhagat et al., 1999), separation of the CEO and Chairman positions (Brickley et al., 1997).

The story in the emerging markets is a bit different: due to ownership structure, which is often concentrated, the companies have rather low motivation to disclose information to outsiders. The need in the minority shareholders is obviously less, compared to the situation in the developed markets. The regulations regarding corporate governance are less strict than they are in the developed stock markets. In most cases these are just recommendations imposed by the local stock exchanges. Anyway, the question of the influence of corporate governance becomes more topical. In case of favourable outcome (positive correlation with stock returns), the obtained results proved by the empirical research can be used to persuade the companies to stick to the best practice.

The available related literature provides the evidence of outperformance of the well-governed companies also in the emerging markets. Roy Kouwenberg (2006) states that the corporate governance matters with regard to Thai public companies: stock return of the best 20% companies according to the CG score in the period 2003-2005 was by 19% p.a. better than the stock return of the weakest 20% companies.

The Indian market represented as NIFTY 50 was studied by Samantaray (2010), who found significant relationship between the share price and such independent variable as EPS, sales, net fixed assets as well as corporate governance factors.

Another important constituent of the corporate governance system is the ethical management, which in parts can be detected by the earnings quality analysis. A number of scientists proved that (Dechow & Dichev, 2001; Mahedy, 2005; Sloan, 1996) the accruals as a measure of earnings plausibility negatively affect equity performance. The US scientists Sloan (1996) and Houge and Loughran (2000) empirically proved that the companies having high accruals perform worse than the companies that do not have any accruals. The analysts of an asset management company Bernstein (Mahedy, 2005)
proved that accruals are a powerful tool, which can be used for predicting future earnings and share performance of the company.

Establishment of the quality corporate governance ensures significant limitation of the agency problem and is intended to maximize shareholders’ as well as other interested parties’ wealth. High quality of the corporate governance (CG) is a guarantee of the long-term trust between the shareholders and the management of the company.

The evidence of the positive correlation of corporate governance quality and the financial wealth of the company was proved by various researchers (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Gompers et al., 2003; Leng, 2004; Moxey, 2004).

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

The expanded notion of the corporate governance includes not only the relation to the system of the governing bodies, but it also covers the ethical approach to the company management as well as the ownership structure.

Therefore, the authors focused on the key dimensions of the corporate governance in its expanded notion: quality of the management team and supervisory board organization, quality of the earnings management and the ownership structure specifics. These corporate governance elements were evaluated separately for the market leaders (outperformers) and the market laggards (underperformers) in terms of the total shareholder return. These groups of companies were compared, according to the following criteria:

- Overall rating of corporate governance quality is based on the model developed by Bistrova and Lace in 2011, which includes the assessment of the board of directors, management team, quality of the investor relations and the information disclosure;
- Earnings quality assessment was based on the evaluation of the accruals level relative to the net operating assets;
- Ownership specifics was evaluated based on the major shareholder type (family, government, financial, strategic owner or free float), on the location of the major holder (local or foreign) and on the ownership concentration level (dispersed or concentrated). The holder was classified as a major holder if it owns more than 10% of the total capital, while the ownership structure was considered to be concentrated if a major holder owns 25% of the capital or more.

The research sample is limited by the quoted CEE companies, which were the components of the local stock exchanges main lists in the financial year 2010. The static sample composition was considered in order to avoid the survivorship bias. The sample list includes 117 companies, the components of the main indices of the CEE stock exchanges: 15 companies traded in the Czech Republic (PX Index), 10 companies traded in Croatia (CROBEX), 12 companies traded in Hungary (BUX), 20 companies traded in Poland (WIG), 10 companies traded in Romania (BET), 7 companies traded in Slovakia (SAX), 6 companies traded in Slovenia (SBI TOP), 13 companies traded in Estonia (OMX BBGI), 5 companies traded in Latvia (OMX BBGI), 19 companies traded in Lithuania (OMX BBGI). These are the largest companies traded in the CEE countries with relatively good liquidity and above average market capitalization compared to other companies traded on the CEE market. One company, Czech electricity company CEZ, has dual listing on Prague Stock Exchange and on Warsaw Stock Exchange, so it was considered only once leading to the overall sample of 116 companies.

The selection of the companies, which managed to deliver sustainable out- or underperformance was made on the annual basis, classifying the company if it managed to beat the equally-weighted performance of the market as the winning company (outperformer), and as the laggard (underperformer) if it delivered TSR below the market return. The timeline of the analysis included 8 annual periods: from 2005 till 2012, which also covered the financial crisis becoming an important milestone for the CEE equity market development. The company was classified as a sustainable outperformer if it delivered above average result for 5 years and more; and it was classified as a sustainable underperformer if it delivered below average result for 5 years and more. The analysis shows that the companies underperforming the market 5 times and more (48 firms) significantly exceed the number of the companies, outperforming the market for 5 years and more (15 firms). Therefore, it was decided to consider also the expanded sample of the outperformers, i.e. the companies delivering alpha for 4 years and more (41 firm).

Corporate Governance assessment model was also used for ranking of the sample companies according to the quality of the corporate governance.

To describe entity’s financial position, the authors selected 5 financial ratios (Table 1), which are commonly used to assess firm’s profitability, operating efficiency and financial stability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Y Variable</th>
<th>Ratio Name</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Return on equity</td>
<td>Profitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpCF/Equity</td>
<td>Operating cash flow return on equity</td>
<td>Profitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Profit margin</td>
<td>Profitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Equity ratio</td>
<td>Financial Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Asset turnover</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As X variables the authors took the following CG indicators, which were based on the CG assessment model:

- TR – Total CG rating;
- SB – Supervisory Board;
- MT – Management Team;
- IR – Investor Relations;
- DI – Disclosure of Information.

As a result, the regression testing of all five financial indicators looked as follows:

\[ Y_t = \alpha + \beta_1 TR_t + \beta_2 SB_t + \beta_3 MT_t + \beta_4 IR_t + \beta_5 DI_t, \]

(1)

The regression was tested according to the equation 1, the above mentioned financial ratios taken as Y. The authors tested two types of the regression: 1) average CG ratings and financial ratios for the period of 9 years (2004-2012); and 2) CG ratings and financial ratios by years for the period 2004-2012.

4. RESEARCH RESULTS

I. Corporate Governance and Market Performance

A. Corporate Governance Quality Evaluation

Corporate governance analysis, made according to the proposed corporate governance model states that the companies, which outperformed for 5 periods and more, are better managed and are more transparent than the average company, while the underperformers have an opposite situation, but the difference, however, is not very substantial (Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Average corporate governance quality levels of out- and underperformers.](image)

Further deeper analysis of the difference of corporate governance quality between the sustainable out- and underperformers proves that the major discrepancy between these two groups of the companies is seen in the quality of the information disclosure and the level of investor relations (Table 2). In the conditions of the limited information availability in the emerging markets investors obviously value more the quality of the information provided by the listed companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supervisory Board</th>
<th>Management Team</th>
<th>Investor Relations</th>
<th>Information Disclosure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outperformed 4 periods and more</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outperformed 5 periods and more</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underperformed 5 periods and more</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quality of the management team organization is not very important aiming to achieve sustainable outperformance. Although the leading companies (outperformed for 5 periods and more) have the highest rating for the supervisory board, also the lagging companies can boast of well-established structures of the board of directors, earning higher rating than the market in general and higher than the expanded sample of the outperformers.

B. Earnings Quality Assessment

Accrual level as a proxy of the earnings quality, which allows defining plausible earnings forecast and, therefore, market expectations, was tested with the two year lag to the equity performance. Two year lag turned to be the optimal for the accruals to have an influence on the stock performance. Obviously data manipulation is negatively reflected in the financial results during the period of more than one year (Bisto, 2014).

The chart (Figure 2) demonstrates that basically in each year the outperformers had lower accrual level, calculated according to the cash flow method, than the companies, which are classified as consistent underperformers.

![Figure 2. Median accruals level (based on C/F calculation methodology) of sustainable out- and underperformers.](image)
the companies, which delivered high alpha. The statement was proved also in case of the profitability (many outperformers had lower than average profitability in 2007). Besides, the accruals level of outperformers and underperformers was calculated according to the data extracted primarily from the corporate balance sheets. The results obtained from this method (proposed by Richardson & Tuna), which assumes net operating assets being in the centre, are not perfectly comparable with the results obtained from the calculations according the cash flow method, when the cash flows from operations and investments are the key elements. The difference between the leading and the lagging companies is not obvious and the logical pattern of the relationship between the sustainable outperformance and very good earnings quality, indicating ethical corporate management, cannot be spotted.

C. Ownership Specifics

According to the data disclosed in Table 3, there is no particular bias to a certain ownership type as the percentage share in every group of the sustainable outperformers is not too much different from the general market. Still the concentrated outperformers sample (5 periods and more) is a bit more widely represented by the companies with the financial and strategic ownership, while a bit less by the companies with the governmental and family ownership. Obviously, CEE family-owned enterprises as opposed to their successful counterparts in the developed markets, are not distinguished by the higher performance alpha and even some out of the researched sample filed for bankruptcy. So, the practice of the “built to last” family enterprises in the CEE financial field is not established yet.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership type</th>
<th>Outperformed 4 periods and more</th>
<th>Outperformed 5 periods and more</th>
<th>Underperformed 5 periods and more</th>
<th>CEE market average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of total number of companies in the segment (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total number of companies classified according to the particular shareholder type (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A third of the companies, which were classified as the underperformers, had foreign investors as major shareholders, while leading companies more often than the general market had local ownership as indicated in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership Domicile</th>
<th>Outperformed 4 periods and more</th>
<th>Outperformed 5 periods and more</th>
<th>Underperformed 5 periods and more</th>
<th>CEE market average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of total number of companies in the segment (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total number of companies classified according to the particular shareholder type (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ownership concentration level obviously has more impact on the performance quality than the previous classifications of the ownership type. The companies, which were consistently underperforming the market, are more likely to have a dispersed ownership as proved by the results in Table 5. The companies delivering sustainable performance alpha in 92% of cases had concentrated shareholding structure, when an institutional or a private investor holds more than 25% of the total capital.

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership Concentration Level</th>
<th>Outperformed 4 periods and more</th>
<th>Outperformed 5 periods and more</th>
<th>Underperformed 5 periods and more</th>
<th>CEE market average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of total number of companies in the segment (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total number of companies classified according to the particular shareholder type (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Possibly concentrated shareholding is the optimal ownership structure for the emerging market at its current development stage. The companies operate more efficiently if the business management decisions are influenced by one party, while the dispersed ownership does not provide the background for the successful enterprise development. It can occur due to
the weak management team being not able to deliver sustainable TSR outperformance and, therefore, is the cause of high agency costs.

II. Corporate Governance and Economic Performance

The authors selected the best 25% and the worst 25% of the companies according to the CG quartiles. The average rating (2004-2012) of the poorly managed companies did not exceed 12.4 CG rating, while the rating of the companies with the excellent CG system was not lower than 16.2. At the same time, the market median was 14.5, indicating that the difference between the best and the worst is not overly significant.

![Graph of profitability ratios according to the CG rating](image)

**Figure 3.** Profitability ratios according to the CG rating (average 2004-2012).

The results show (Figure 3) that the companies, which were classified as the leaders according to the CG rating showed above average profitability ratios, which is seen in all cases of the profitability measures. In contrast, poorly managed companies exhibit significantly lower equity capital profitability and profit margin compared to the well-managed companies as well as to the market average. Interestingly, the companies with weak governance are able to provide above market average operating cash flow to equity ratio.

So, although excellent corporate governance requires additional costs for establishment, maintenance and control, as well as intangible costs, according to Figure 4.11 results, investments in good corporate governance pay off in the end with higher than average profitability. And further, the companies with higher profitability can set aside funds to further improve corporate governance system.

Checking the business efficiency of the CEE companies as measured by the asset turnover ratio provides evidence that the enterprises with the best CG ratings lose to the whole market as well to the companies with weak CG standards (Figure 4).

![Graph of profitability ratios according to the CG rating](image)

**Figure 4.** Profitability ratios according to the CG rating (average 2004-2012).

Analyzing the preference of the well and poorly managed companies for the balance sheet financing, it cannot be said that there is any substantial difference of the equity share financing between the worst and the best companies according to the CG quality. The companies having the weakest CG ratings obviously pursue a bit more conservative financing policy (equity ratio - 49%) compared to the market (48%) as well as to the companies showing the best CG ratings (45%).

Such situation can be in a certain way explained by the conservativeness of the shareholders in every respect – sticking to the Best CG practice and keeping stable balance sheets.

Further analysis of the relations between corporate governance and the firm’s financial performance is conducted with the help of the multiple regressions, built according to the methodology described above. The data provided in Table 6 demonstrate that only two regressions explaining the return on equity and profit margins with the corporate governance quality turned out to be significant.

**Table 6**

Multiple regressions statistics
(Y variables – financial ratios; average CG ratings and financial ratios for 2004-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Multiple R (%)</th>
<th>R Square (%)</th>
<th>F-test</th>
<th>Significant Independent Variables (T-tests)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.452*</td>
<td>SB (-1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpCF/Equity</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.654</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.785*</td>
<td>CG (2.56), SB (-2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at α=5%; **significant at α=10% ;
board organization and the profitability of the company, which goes in contrast with the hypothesis stated. However, profit margin regression shows that the overall corporate governance rating significantly positively affects the firm’s ability to generate higher margin. Here, the question might arise about the exogenous and endogenous input variables as the good corporate governance may be a result of high margins allowing the firm to invest in the corporate governance system.

Having a larger number of the observations due to taking the annual values instead of the average values for the whole period provides more statistically significant regressions (Table 7). Overall, corporate governance rating positively influences equity capital profitability, while has a negative relationship with the equity ratio and with the asset turnover (as it was also evident earlier in the graphical analysis).

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Multiple R (%)</th>
<th>R Square (%)</th>
<th>F-test</th>
<th>Significant Independent Variables (T-tests)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.466*</td>
<td>CG (1.91**), DI (-2.95*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpCF/</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.881</td>
<td>SB (-1.82**), IR (-2.0*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CB (-1.96**), DI (1.73**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.186**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.092*</td>
<td>MT (2.58*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.492*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at α=5%; **significant at α=10%;

An analysis on the relation of the parts of corporate governance to the corporate economic performance does not provide a consistent view: disclosure of information quality positively influences equity ratio and operating cash flow to equity, while negatively – ROE. Excellent management team organization supports efficiency of the company.

CONCLUSIONS

The obtained research results on the relationship between the corporate governance systems and equity performance robustness within the CEE stock markets partially prove the hypothesis, indicating that not every corporate governance aspect is crucial in search of the long-term performance alpha.

The study on the corporate governance environment discrepancies between the good and the bad companies in terms of the performance consists of the three parts: a) the general evaluation of the governance, where the primary focus was put on the management and supervisory board; b) the quality of earnings assessment, which alludes to a certain extent to the ethics of the management approach; c) the research on the ownership influence, considering the typology of the major owner, its location and the degree of the ownership concentration.

Though the leading companies can boast of the higher than average quality of the corporate governance in contrast to the lagging companies, the difference is not significant. Detailed analysis of the corporate governance elements evidences that the difference in the CG rating primarily is achieved by the very good information disclosure of the outperforming companies. This observation indicates high importance of the transparency of the company in the emerging European, where the media coverage of the listed companies is rather limited.

Earnings quality, which in the present research paper was evaluated based on the accruals level, has a potential to become an important factor to distinguish between the sustainable outperformers and the sustainable underperformers. The accruals calculated according to the cash flow method clearly are lower for the companies delivering sustainable outperformers basically through the whole observation period.

Ownership structure analysis evidences that the type of the major shareholder does not matter when selecting the stocks for the equity portfolio. The location of the major owner obviously has a more significant effect than the type of the shareholding. The most significant discrepancy between the market outperformers and market underperformers though appears when considering the shareholder structure concentration level. The investors are advised to give preference to the concentrated ownership, when selecting the companies for the “long” strategy equity portfolio in the emerging CEE equity market.

When describing 25% best and 25% worst companies from the CG perspective according to their financial performance, it was discovered that the companies with the best CG ratings deliver above average profitability (return on equity, profit margin, operating cash flow to equity), while below average business efficiency (asset turnover). The difference in the financial stability as measured by the equity ratio was not substantial between the best and the poorly managed companies. Therefore, the companies having excellent CG systems could not deliver better than average financial ratios in in every analyzed case.

Basically similar results were confirmed by the multiple regression statistics calculated for two different periods – the average ratios for 2004-2012
and the annual ratios. The overall corporate governance rating positively influences return on equity and the profit margin, while it has a negative influence on the financial stability and the efficiency of the company. Separate elements of the corporate governance system appeared ambiguous, thus, making it hard to make robust conclusions on their influence on the financial performance.

One of the complicated questions faced in the course of the study, also described by a number of researchers (Brown et al., 2011) is the endogeneity problem of the corporate governance related assessment and its relationship to the financial performance of the entity. It might be complicated to understand what is the input variable – whether good corporate governance increases the profitability of the company or good profitability allows making additional investment to improve the corporate governance system to comply with the best practices and to become more attractive for the market participants.

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REFERENCES

